The Role Of Market Definition in Assessing Anticompetitive Harm in Ohio v. American Express

The Role Of Market Definition in Assessing Anticompetitive Harm in Ohio v. American Express

By David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee –  This article shows that the Supreme Court reached the right outcome in Ohio et al. v. American Express. The District Court had found that American Express was a two-sided transaction platform that provided joint services simultaneously to cardholders and merchants. But it then chose, by adopting a […]

Ohio v. American Express: Assessing the Threat to Antitrust Enforcement

Ohio v. American Express: Assessing the Threat to Antitrust Enforcement

By Michael L. Katz –  One year later, the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Ohio v. American Express remains a glaring example of the misapplication of economic theory coupled with disregard for the factual record. If applied to other cases, the approach to antitrust analysis stated in that opinion would threaten sound enforcement. In this […]

Ohio v. American Express: Implications for Non-Transaction Multisided Platforms

Ohio v. American Express: Implications for Non-Transaction Multisided Platforms

By Joshua D. Wright & John M. Yun –  The Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. American Express settled a number of critical issues concerning multisided platforms — including whether each side of a platform constitutes a separate relevant product market. The ruling also addressed whether a prima facie assessment of competitive harm must incorporate […]

Antitrust Analysis of Vertical Contracts in Two-Sided Platforms: The Amex Decision

Antitrust Analysis of Vertical Contracts in Two-Sided Platforms: The Amex Decision

By Benjamin Klein –  The recent Amex decision emphasizes that antitrust analysis of vertical restraints used in two-sided platforms must consider both sides of the platform. This does not mean that the anticompetitive effects of restraints should be measured by aggregating the net price over the two sides. Instead, consistent with the established U.S. antitrust […]

Ohio v. American Express: The Supreme Court Still Passes the Test

Ohio v. American Express: The Supreme Court Still Passes the Test

By Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. –  In the early 1970’s antitrust was dominated by per se rules; in United States v. Topco Associates (1972) the Supreme Court ridiculed the use of economics. Shortly thereafter, however, the Court shifted ground, making economics the touchstone of antitrust analysis outside the cartel context. Ohio v. American Express carries […]

Not So Fast, You Still Have to Define the Relevant Market: The Less Debated Yet Vital Teaching of Ohio v. American Express

Not So Fast, You Still Have to Define the Relevant Market: The Less Debated Yet Vital Teaching of Ohio v. American Express

By Elai Katz –  Most discussions of Ohio v. America Express focus on two-sided markets. This article will not. Instead, the article analyzes the Court’s ruling that plaintiffs cannot evade defining the relevant market when challenging vertical restraints (and arguably other practices subject to the rule-of-reason). In holding that courts must first define the relevant […]

Antitrust Chronicle – Damages & Fines

Antitrust Chronicle – Damages & Fines

Dear Readers, This month’s CPI Chronicle focuses on antitrust damages and fines, with particular consideration to cartel damages. Internationally, there is a patchwork of private and public enforcement of antitrust laws with varying damages and fines. Does this enforcement reflect clear concepts of justice and compensation and concepts that are consistent with a fundamental notion […]

The Ambivalent Effect of Antitrust Damages on Deterrence

The Ambivalent Effect of Antitrust Damages on Deterrence

By Miriam C. Buiten –  When a cartel is revealed, cartel participants face substantial civil damages claims next to public fines. In Europe, the recent increase in private damages actions brought on the concern that the leniency program could become less attractive, since they shield firms only from public fines. At the same time, civil […]

The Difference-in-Differences Approach in the Estimation of Cartel Damage

The Difference-in-Differences Approach in the Estimation of Cartel Damage

By Frank P. Maier-Rigaud & Slobodan Sudaric –  A crucial step in the quantification of damage in the context of damages claims is the estimation of the counterfactual price level: the price level that would have been observed in the absence of the cartel. This article discusses the Difference-in-Differences (“DiD”) estimation procedure for the estimation […]