Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act

Sep 01, 2005 A firm may reduce its prices in an attempt to destroy its rivals or to deter new entry. Although the Sherman Act has long been construed to prohibit this practice, the case law on predatory pricing has been characterized by vagueness and a paucity of economic analysis. In this Article, Professors Areeda […]

Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy: A Reaction to Cooper, Froeb, O’Brien, and Vita

Ralph Winter, Sep 01, 2005 Cooper, Froeb, OBrien, and Vita argue that (1) economic theory, especially post-Chicago theory, provides little in the way of unambiguous predictions of when vertical restraints are pro-competitive versus anticompetitive, forcing antitrust decisions to rely mainly on prior empirical evidence rather than case-specific facts; and (2) prior evidence indicates that vertical […]

An Introduction to Bork (1966)

Douglas Ginsburg, Apr 01, 2006 The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, the cornerstone of the U.S. antitrust regime, broadly prohibits contacts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade and makes it unlawful to monopolize any line of commerce. The open-textured nature of the Act”not unlike a general principle of common law”vests the judiciary with considerable […]

Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act

Apr 01, 2006 Despite the obvious importance of the question to a statute as vaguely phrased as the Sherman Act, the federal courts in all the years since 1890 have never arrived at a definitive statement of the values or policies which control the law’s application and evolution. The question of values, therefore, remains central […]

Court of First Instance Upholds Prohibition of General Electric/Honeywell

Shaun Goodman, Apr 01, 2006 On December 14, 2005, the European Court of First Instance (CFI) upheld the European Commission’s 2001 prohibition of a proposed merger between General Electric (GE) and Honeywell (the Decision). The Decision’s partial reliance on conglomerate effects theories had been controversial at the time, and the Commission was criticised in strong […]

Rejoinder to Cooper, Froeb, O’Brien, and Vita’s Reply

Ralph Winter, Apr 01, 2006 In this rejoinder, the author first responds to the discussion in Cooper, Froeb, O’Brien, and Vita’s Reply to Winter of a technical point, the relationship between retailer incentives and retailer margins, and then sets out their common ground and remaining differences on the broader theme of theory and evidence in […]

Reply to Winter’s Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy: A Reaction to Cooper, Froeb, O’Brien, and Vita

James Cooper, Luke Froeb, Daniel O’Brien, Michael Vita, Apr 01, 2006 In the Autumn 2005 issue of Competition Policy International, the authors published an article on the antitrust policy implications of the theoretical and empirical literature on vertical restraints. In an accompanying comment, Professor Ralph Winter claims that the authors are advocating an enforcement standard […]

Competition in EU Trading and Post-Trading Service Markets

Bernhard Friess, Sean Greenaway, Apr 01, 2006 The structure of trading service markets is a fundamental determinant of the cost of capital for business. Competition has an important role to play in delivering efficiencies, particularly in the context of inherited fragmentation that characterizes the European Union, and to this end regulation and competition policy need […]

Classic Papers on Predatory Pricing

Keith Hylton, Sep 01, 2005 Perhaps no area of antitrust law provokes as much controversy as predatory pricing, the theory that a firm violates the antitrust laws by setting its price too low. Under the standard definition, predatory pricing involves a strategy of cutting price below the level at which a competitor can survive in […]

Below-Cost Pricing and Loyalty-Inducing Discounts: Are They Restrictive and If So, When?

Alberto Heimler, Sep 01, 2005 Abuse of dominance is the area where the divergence between U.S. and EC antitrust enforcement practices is still very significant. In particular, in the European Community, the identification of price abuses is mostly based on the abstract ability to exclude, while in the United States, the emphasis is mainly on […]