Loyalty Rebates: An Assessment of Competition Concerns and a Proposed Structured Rule of Reason

David Spector, Sep 01, 2005 Like most pricing practices, loyalty rebates may benefit or harm consumers according to the circumstances. This paper reviews the pro-competitive and anticompetitive motives for loyalty rebates. This paper concludes by proposing a structured rule of reason for the antitrust handling of loyalty rebates cases.

Mario Monti’s Legacy: A U.S. Perspective

William Kolasky, Apr 01, 2005 The departure of Commissioner Mario Monti from his post as the EC Commissioner for competition policy provides a good opportunity to reflect upon the achievements and perceived failures of the European Commission in the field of antitrust law over the past five years. This paper attempts to do so on […]

The Changing Role of Economics in Competition Policy Decisions by the European Commission During the Monti Years

David Evans, Carsten Grave, Apr 01, 2005 This paper examines the evolution of the use of economics in EC competition policy matters and the reforms in the use of economics that occurred in the latter part of EC Competition Commissioner Mario Monti’s term (1999-2004). Under his predecessors, the use of economics had been steadily increasing […]

Mario Monti’s Legacy in EC Merger Control

Nicholas Levy, Apr 01, 2005 Mario Monti’s tenure as EC Commissioner for competition policy between September 1999 and November 2004 coincided with one of the most eventful periods in EC merger control since the Merger Regulation came into force in 1990. This article places his tenure in historical perspective, describes the principal European Commission decisions […]

Mario Monti’s Legacy for Competition Policy in Article 82

Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, John Ratliff, Apr 01, 2005 Commissioner Mario Monti’s impact on Article 82 of the EC Treaty during his period as EC Competition Commissioner has not been as revolutionary as his impact on other areas of EC competition law. Nonetheless, the European Commission has done serious work on Article 82 cases, notably taking several […]

Comment on Cooper et al.’s “Vertical Restrictions and Antitrust Policy”

F.M. Scherer, Sep 01, 2005 This paper provides a critical analysis of the paper on vertical restraints and competition policy by James Cooper et al. The author expresses mild disagreement concerning the origins and content of the relevant theory, although he agrees that theory offers ambiguous guidance to antitrust enforcers.

Determinants of Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States

Leah Brannon, Douglas Ginsburg, Sep 01, 2005 This paper offers a historical overview of private antitrust enforcement in the United States and an explanation of why private case filings have increased and decreased over the years. It addresses: (1) some of the general factors influencing the level of private litigation; (2) the historical trend in […]

Judicial Review in EC and U.S. Antitrust Law

Valentine Korah, Sep 01, 2005 The first two articles of this issue are based on presentations for the inaugural edition of the University College London Antitrust Forum held on March 3, 2005. Sir Christopher Bellamy, President of the U.K. Competition Appeal Tribunal, chaired the event. Bo Vesterdorf, President of the European Court of First Instance […]

Vertical Restrictions and Antitrust Policy: What About the Evidence?

James Cooper, Luke Froeb, Daniel O’Brien, Michael Vita, Sep 01, 2005 Until theory can be used to determine how likely it is that a restraint will lead to an anticompetitive outcome, decision makers will be left with a considerable amount of uncertainty. In this world, enforcement decisions should be guided by prior beliefs and loss […]

A Commentary on DG Competition’s Discussion Paper

Bill Allan, Apr 01, 2006 DG Competition’s discussion paper appears to signal a departure from the form-based approach articulated most strongly in Michelin II. However, its full significance is limited by the enunciation of a precautionary principle under which abuse is framed to capture any conduct likely to limit entry or expansion and justification is […]