Ralph Winter, Apr 01, 2006 In this rejoinder, the author first responds to the discussion in Cooper, Froeb, O’Brien, and Vita’s Reply to Winter of a technical point, the relationship between retailer incentives and retailer margins, and then sets out their common ground and remaining differences on the broader theme of theory and evidence in […]
Reply to Winter’s Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy: A Reaction to Cooper, Froeb, O’Brien, and Vita
James Cooper, Luke Froeb, Daniel O’Brien, Michael Vita, Apr 01, 2006 In the Autumn 2005 issue of Competition Policy International, the authors published an article on the antitrust policy implications of the theoretical and empirical literature on vertical restraints. In an accompanying comment, Professor Ralph Winter claims that the authors are advocating an enforcement standard […]
Bernhard Friess, Sean Greenaway, Apr 01, 2006 The structure of trading service markets is a fundamental determinant of the cost of capital for business. Competition has an important role to play in delivering efficiencies, particularly in the context of inherited fragmentation that characterizes the European Union, and to this end regulation and competition policy need […]
Keith Hylton, Sep 01, 2005 Perhaps no area of antitrust law provokes as much controversy as predatory pricing, the theory that a firm violates the antitrust laws by setting its price too low. Under the standard definition, predatory pricing involves a strategy of cutting price below the level at which a competitor can survive in […]
Alberto Heimler, Sep 01, 2005 Abuse of dominance is the area where the divergence between U.S. and EC antitrust enforcement practices is still very significant. In particular, in the European Community, the identification of price abuses is mostly based on the abstract ability to exclude, while in the United States, the emphasis is mainly on […]
Bruce Kobayashi, Sep 01, 2006 The courts treatment of loyalty discounts under U.S. antitrust laws is broadly consistent with an approach that recognizes the high costs of erroneously condemning behavior that would lower prices and increase welfare, and the speculative nature of the anticompetitive harm that might result.
David Spector, Sep 01, 2005 Like most pricing practices, loyalty rebates may benefit or harm consumers according to the circumstances. This paper reviews the pro-competitive and anticompetitive motives for loyalty rebates. This paper concludes by proposing a structured rule of reason for the antitrust handling of loyalty rebates cases.
William Kolasky, Apr 01, 2005 The departure of Commissioner Mario Monti from his post as the EC Commissioner for competition policy provides a good opportunity to reflect upon the achievements and perceived failures of the European Commission in the field of antitrust law over the past five years. This paper attempts to do so on […]
The Changing Role of Economics in Competition Policy Decisions by the European Commission During the Monti Years
David Evans, Carsten Grave, Apr 01, 2005 This paper examines the evolution of the use of economics in EC competition policy matters and the reforms in the use of economics that occurred in the latter part of EC Competition Commissioner Mario Monti’s term (1999-2004). Under his predecessors, the use of economics had been steadily increasing […]
Nicholas Levy, Apr 01, 2005 Mario Monti’s tenure as EC Commissioner for competition policy between September 1999 and November 2004 coincided with one of the most eventful periods in EC merger control since the Merger Regulation came into force in 1990. This article places his tenure in historical perspective, describes the principal European Commission decisions […]