In this issue:

The subject of merger remedies dramatically demonstrates the increasing complexity of antitrust regulation. In this issue, organized by Danny Sokol, we look at problems with conditions imposed on proposed mergers, including (i) dealing with ever-changing high-tech markets, (ii) conflicts across multiple regimes, (iii) competition laws that deal with more than maintaining competitive markets, (iv) asking whether authorities or companies should design solutions, and (v) minority ownership. Plus we have two Of Special Interest articles—defining relevant markets, and the new Greek method of identifying collusion. Happy holidays, everyone!

Merger Remedies

Daniel Sokol, Dec 16, 2014

The Broader Implications of Merger Remedies in High Technology Markets

A number of cases suggest that competition authorities should undertake a more nuanced view of how technology markets work in their merger remedies. D. Daniel Sokol (Univ. of Florida)

Kellie Kemp, Scott Sher, Dec 16, 2014

A Comparative Analysis of the Use of Merger Remedies in Technology Industries

Technology mergers present issues not often present in combinations occurring in more traditional industries, and jurisdictions around the globe are dealing with such challenges differently. Scott Sher & Kellie Kemp (Wilson Sonsini)

Adam DiVincenzo, Dec 16, 2014

The Real Threat Posed by Global Merger Enforcement Divergence

So which divergence problems relating to remedies pose the greatest challenge to the international merger control system? Adam J. Di Vincenzo (Gibson, Dunn)

Ana Paula Martinez, Mariana Tavares de Araujo, Dec 16, 2014

Merger Remedies in Transnational Mergers: When Less is More

In practice, creativity in devising merger remedies can very easily lead to conflicting decisions in global deals. Ana Paula Martinez & Mariana Tavares de Araujo (Levy & Salomão Advogados)

Nicholas Levy, Dec 16, 2014

Expanding EU Merger Control to Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings: A Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut?

Although there is theoretical support for the notion that structural links may in certain circumstances raise antitrust concerns, the available evidence is insufficient to justify the EUMR’s expansion. Nicholas Levy (Cleary Gottlieb)

Keith Klovers, Christine Wilson, Dec 16, 2014

Yes We Can, But Should We? Merger Remedies During the First Obama Administration

Some agency remedies, such as compulsory innovation, compulsory licensing, and detailed conduct remedies that border on industrial engineering, risk exactly the kind of “costly government entanglement in the market” that the 2004 Policy Guide sought to avoid. Christine Wilson & Keith Klovers (Kirkland & Ellis)

Of Special Interest

David Balto, Matthew Lane, Dec 16, 2014

Finding the Right Lodestar for Defining Markets

It is far from unreasonable to require that qualitative evidence of a separate market be supported by an accepted economic test when the data required to perform such a test is readily available. David Balto & Matthew Lane (Law Offices of David A. Balto)

Lia Vitzilaiou, Dec 16, 2014

The HCC Guide on the Detection and Prevention of Collusive Tendering

The guide may be used by tenderers not only to self regulate, but also to scrutinize and denounce the behavior of other candidates and thus assist competition authorities in detecting cartel activity. Lia Vitzilaiou (Lambadarios Law Firm)