In this issue:

This issue, organized by guest editor Glen Weyl, concerns one of the hottest topics in antitrust and economics—two-sided markets. Understanding the distinction between conventional and two-sided markets is a necessary challenge for practitioners, corporate executives, and regulators alike; our writers investigate some of these differences. Lapo Filistrucchi questions how many markets are, in fact, two-sided, while Joshua Gans focuses in on price signals. Renato Gomes looks at sponsored search auctions and Hanna HaÅ‚aburda & MikoÅ‚aj Jan Piskorski ask when a platform should give people fewer choices—but charge more. Shanker Singham & Kaushal Sharma bring an international and regulatory perspective while Pai-Ling Yin contrasts membership and usage. Enjoy!


Two-Sided Markets

Lapo Filistrucchi, Jul 27, 2010

How Many Markets are Two-Sided?

Once one accepts that two-sided markets are different, one wonders whether competition authorities have, so far, been doing everything wrong. Lapo Filistrucchi, Tilburg Univ. & Univ. of Florence

Joshua Gans, Jul 27, 2010

Price Signals in Two-Sided Markets

A seeming lack of price competition to one set of consumers may mask competition for another, related set of consumers. Joshua Gans, University of Melbourne

Renato Gomes, Jul 27, 2010

Sponsored Search Auctions: Simple Economics and Implications for Antitrust Policy

Surprisingly, concentrated markets can be welfare-improving when search engines are not able to subsidize (or charge) searchers for their clicking behavior. Renato Gomes, Toulouse School of Economics

Hanna Halaburda, Mikolaj Jan Piskorski, Jul 27, 2010

When Should a Platform Give People Fewer Choices and Charge More for Them?

How can some platforms offer less choice and yet charge more to participate? Hanna Hałaburda & Mikołaj Jan Piskorski, Harvard Business School

Kaushal Sharma, Shanker Singham, Jul 27, 2010

Maximizing Competition in the Case of Two-Sided Markets

The differences between traditional markets and two-sided markets need to be understood as much by regulators as those operating in the markets.Shanker Singham & Kaushal Sharma, Squire Sanders & Dempsey and Competition Commission of India

Estelle Cantillon, Pai-Ling Yin, Jul 27, 2010

A Tale of Two Games: Membership Versus Usage in Platform Competition

The distinction between membership demand and demand for usage in platform competition is often ignored. Estelle Cantillon ECARES, Universite Libr de Bruxelles & Pai-Ling Yin, Sloan School of Management at MIT