In this issue:
This issue, organized by guest editor Glen Weyl, concerns one of the hottest topics in antitrust and economics—two-sided markets. Understanding the distinction between conventional and two-sided markets is a necessary challenge for practitioners, corporate executives, and regulators alike; our writers investigate some of these differences. Lapo Filistrucchi questions how many markets are, in fact, two-sided, while Joshua Gans focuses in on price signals. Renato Gomes looks at sponsored search auctions and Hanna HaÅ‚aburda & MikoÅ‚aj Jan Piskorski ask when a platform should give people fewer choices—but charge more. Shanker Singham & Kaushal Sharma bring an international and regulatory perspective while Pai-Ling Yin contrasts membership and usage. Enjoy!
Once one accepts that two-sided markets are different, one wonders whether competition authorities have, so far, been doing everything wrong. Lapo Filistrucchi, Tilburg Univ. & Univ. of Florence
A seeming lack of price competition to one set of consumers may mask competition for another, related set of consumers. Joshua Gans, University of Melbourne
Surprisingly, concentrated markets can be welfar