Spring 2012, Volume 3 Number 1

In this issue:

Our issue this month, organized by Rosa Abrantes-Metz, brings together antitrust theory and practice. We look at the econometric approach of screening as a way to identify possible cartels and other collusive activities, analyzing how to apply screens both from the regulators' and the potential defendants' perspectives. The analysis is illustrated with real-life applications to the LIBOR market, bid-rigging in Mexico, and price-fixing in Brazil. We conclude with a special interest article giving an indepth comparison of the U.S. and European approaches to quantifying antitrust damages. 

Using Screens Effectively
  1. Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Albert Metz, Mar 13, 2012

    How Far Can Screens Go in Distinguishing Explicit from Tacit Collusion? New Evidence on the Libor Setting

    We explore, in the context of the Libor, whether screens can move one step further and distinguish illegal (explicit) from legal (tacit) collusion. Rosa Abrantes-Metz (Global Economics Group) & Albert Metz (Moody's Investor Services)

  2. Donald Klawiter, Mar 13, 2012

    Conspiracy Screens: Practical Defense Perspectives

    Screens can rationally determine critical points in a possible cartel, including the duration, breadth, and success of a conspiracy...Donald C. Klawiter (Sheppard Mullin)

  3. Carlos Mena-Labarthe, Mar 13, 2012

    Mexican Experience in Screens for Bid-Rigging

    As experience has proved, screens have flagged unusual patterns in a variety of countries and industries, and helped in the detection of cartels. Carlos Mena-Labarthe (Mexican Federal Competition Commission)

  4. Carlos Ragazzo, Mar 13, 2012

    Screens in the Gas Retail Market: The Brazilian Experience

    It is not an overstatement to say that the use of screens in the gas retail market was a success. Carlos Emmanuel Joppert Ragazzo (CADE, Brazil)

Of Special Interest
  1. Claire Korenblit, Mar 13, 2012

    Quantifying Antitrust Damages – Convergence of Methods Recognized by U.S. Courts and the European Commission

    The methods recognized by U.S. courts and the European Commission underlying the procedural and quantitative tools and techniques for quantifying antitrust damages have more similarities than differences. Claire M. Korenblit (Sidley Austin)


About the Antitrust Chronicle

The CPI Antitrust Chronicle is published online, semi-monthly. It contains cutting-edge commentary on current global antitrust and competition policy issues.

Past Issues



Managing Editor: Lauren Chiang

Senior Editor: Lindsay W. McSweeney

Social Media: Anna Tzanaki

Subscription Manager: Susan Roberts

Office Manager: Kristen Adrian

Editorial Advisory Board:

Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Global Econ. Group, Stern School of Bus. at NYU

Kent Bernard, Fordham School of Law

Rachel Brandenburger, Washington D.C.

Adrian Emch, Hogan Lovells

Kyriakos Fountoukakos, Herbert Smith

Jay Himes, Labaton Sucharow

James Killick, White & Case

Stephen Kinsella, Sidley Austin

Ioannis Lianos, University College London

Elisa Mariscal, Federal Competition Commission, Mexico

Robert O'Donoghue, Brick Court Chambers

Aaron Panner, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen

Nicolas Petit, University of Lìege

Daniel Sokol, University of Florida Levin School of Law

Joshua Wright, George Mason Law School