MAY-12(1)
Spring 2012, Volume 5 Number 1
In this issue:
The U.K. competition authority structure is undergoing remodeling and we have several experts weighing in to take questions: How is the new organization going to react with other U.K. authorities? How best to integrate two different approaches to decision making? Should merger notification still be voluntary? What are the appropriate safeguards to ensure impartial decisions? What does the removal of "dishonesty" from the cartel offense mean? Both already established and newly developing competition regimes should be able to learn a lot from the U.K. process. And since we like to track of the ongoing saga of the antitrust world v. Google, we present a comparison with the historical Microsoft case. Enjoy!
- Restructuring a Competition Authority: The U.K. Challenge
-
-
Will the New U.K. Competition and Markets Authority Make Better Antitrust Decisions?
To understand the potential effectiveness of the CMA, we need to understand the organizations that are being merged. The CC and OFT are very different animals. Bruce Lyons (CCP, Univ. of East Anglia)
-
It Takes One to Tango: The Single U.K. Competition And Markets Authority
What, however, has been less emphasized in the discussions surrounding the reform is the role of the CAT in this new institutional setting. Despoina Mantzari & Valentine Korah (UCL)
-
Functional Separation in the U.K. Competition Regime
The vocal “due process†arguments raised from all quarters have thus been accommodated by imposing some form of functional separation within the CMA but without mandating its form. Renato Nazzini (Univ. of Southampton)
-
The Removal of Dishonesty from the Cartel Offence and the Publication Defence: A Panacea?
While little may have changed for businesses, the Government’s reforms could have more significant repercussions for individuals. Ruchit Patel (Cleary Gottlieb)
-
The Competition and Markets Authority: A New Era for U.K. Competition Law Enforcement?
While the original impetus may have been one of cost cutting and the creation of efficiencies, the merger may in reality be seen by many as more of a philosophical change. Paula Riedel & Anna Mitchell (Linklaters)
-
- An Additional Word on Google
-
-
The Microsoft Case and Google
However the market is defined, it is highly unlikely that a court applying the analytical framework utilized in Microsoft will find that Google possesses durable monopoly power. Stephen D. Houck (Menaker & Herrmann)
-
About the Antitrust Chronicle
The CPI Antitrust Chronicle is published online, semi-monthly. It contains cutting-edge commentary on current global antitrust and competition policy issues.
Past Issues
- Winter 2015 - Volume 2 Number 1
- Winter 2015 - Volume 1 Number 2
- Winter 2015 - Volume 1 Number 1
- Winter 2014 - Volume 12 Number 2
- Autumn 2014 - Volume 12 Number 1
- Autumn 2014 - Volume 11 Number 2
Archives
President: Elisa Mariscal
Managing Editor: Lauren Chiang
Senior Editor: Lindsay W. McSweeney
Social Media: Anna Tzanaki
Subscription Manager: Susan Roberts
Office Manager: Kristen Adrian
Editorial Advisory Board:
Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Global Econ. Group, Stern School of Bus. at NYU
Kent Bernard, Fordham School of Law
Rachel Brandenburger, Washington D.C.
Adrian Emch, Hogan Lovells
Kyriakos Fountoukakos, Herbert Smith
Jay Himes, Labaton Sucharow
James Killick, White & Case
Stephen Kinsella, Sidley Austin
Ioannis Lianos, University College London
Elisa Mariscal, Federal Competition Commission, Mexico
Robert O'Donoghue, Brick Court Chambers
Aaron Panner, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen
Nicolas Petit, University of Lìege
Daniel Sokol, University of Florida Levin School of Law
Joshua Wright, George Mason Law School