Confession Consequences in a Crowded Investigative Environment: Complexities in Cooperation with Multiple Authorities in Cartel Investigations

This article is part of a Chronicle. See more from this Chronicle Rein Wesseling, Sep 16, 2015 Amnesty and leniency applications have frequently been compared to confessions in the Catholic Church. The parallel is evident for the confession part. But what about the penance? In the Catholic Church there is no fixed catalog of actions […]

10 Ways to Preserve the Lustre of Leniency

This article is part of a Chronicle. See more from this Chronicle Grant Murray, Douglas Tween, Feb 26, 2014 Today, the allure of antitrust immunity is unmistakable. Almost all of the most prominent global cartel cases have originated from immunity applications and, in recognition, new leniency regimes are being adopted or fine-tuned in all key […]

Conspiracy Screens: Practical Defense Perspectives

Donald Klawiter, Mar 13, 2012 Despite the enormous increase in cartel detection and the internationalization of both detection and enforcement since 1995, many believe that the enforcement agencies have just scratched the surface. How do the enforcers-and compliance counsel-detect more cartel activity? Simply put, aggressive compliance, due diligence, econometric analysis, leniency programs, and careful observation […]

How To Catch A Thief — Corporate Leniency And The Irrepressible Challenge Of Cartel Detection; Finding A Better Way

Rick Dumas-Eymard, Gordon Schnell, Sep 27, 2011 Perhaps it can be traced back to 1879, when Eugen Richter, a member of the German Parliament, stood in the Reichstag and, borrowing from the vocabulary of war, denounced as a “cartel” an open and notorious arrangement among rail, truck, and locomotive producers to charge their domestic customers […]

The Sherman Act’s Criminal Extraterritorial Reach: Unresolved Questions Raised By United States v. AU Optronics Corp

Anthony Biagioli, Mark Popofsky, Aug 30, 2011 Over the last decade, the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ’s”) vigorous criminal antitrust enforcement-driven by amnesty for the first self-reporting company-has led numerous companies and executives to plead guilty. Indeed, over the last decade, no corporate defendant (and only a few individuals) has taken the government to trial in […]

Introduction of Leniency Programs for Cartel Participants: The Russian Case

Svetlana Avdasheva, Andrey Shastitko, Aug 30, 2011 Collusion of market participants is one of the most dangerous forms of restriction of competition, adversely affecting incentives and, as a consequence, allocation and production efficiencies. According to some estimates, the average price rise under price-fixing is 10 percent ; several studies give even higher estimates. For example, […]

Improving Deterrence of Hard-Core Cartels

Mariana Tavares de Araujo, Nov 05, 2010 The purpose of this paper is to discuss Ginsburg’s & Wright’s proposal to enhance deterrence of hard-core cartels by shifting sanctions away from corporations towards perpetrators and other responsible individuals; and by specifically including the possibility of debarment as an option of sanction against corporate officers and directors. […]

It Ain’t Funny How Time Slips Away: Amnesty Recipient Cooperation in Civil Antitrust Litigation

This article is part of a Chronicle. See more from this Chronicle Jay Himes, Aug 13, 2009 Five years ago, Congress enacted the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 (“ACPERA”), part of which offers reduced civil damage exposure to a cartel participant who receives amnesty under the Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s […]