Governing the Patent Commons

By Dirk Auer & Julian Morris (International Center for Law and Economics) Thousands of patents underpin the technologies that power the digital economy. Coordination among firms developing and implementing these novel technologies has notably been facilitated in large part by Standards Developing Organizations (SDOs). Despite the evident benefits of standardization in general and SDOs in […]

The Alignment of Evidence and Economics: A Rebuttal to Ginsburg and Wright

The Alignment of Evidence and Economics: A Rebuttal to Ginsburg and Wright

June 2019 The Alignment of Evidence and Economics: A Rebuttal to Ginsburg and Wright By Joseph Kattan & Timothy J. Muris1 Click here for a PDF version of the article   Introduction In a March article in CPI’s Blog O’ Blogs, Judge Douglas Ginsburg and Professor Joshua Wright (“G&W”) criticized the Nash bargaining model of […]

What the Servier judgment teaches us about market definition under Article 102 and patent settlement agreements under Article 101

What the Servier judgment  teaches us about market definition under Article 102 and patent settlement agreements under Article 101

February 2019 CPI EU News Column edited by Thibault Schrepel, Sam Sadden & Jan Roth (CPI) presents: What the Servier judgment1 teaches us about market definition under Article 102 and patent settlement agreements under Article 101 By James Killick, Jérémie Jourdan & Pierre Pêcheux (White & Case)2 Click here for a PDF version of the article For […]

Proportional Restraints in Horizontal Patent Settlements

Posted by Social Science Research Network Proportional Restraints in Horizontal Patent Settlements   By Erik Hovenkamp & Jorge Lemus  When rivals settle a patent dispute, they prefer to preserve monopoly profits, even if the patent is very likely invalid or noninfringed. Antitrust has come to embrace a policy that requires horizontal settlements to restrain competition by no […]

Why Patent Hold-Up Does Not Violate Antitrust Law

Posted by Social Science Research Network Why Patent Hold-Up Does Not Violate Antitrust Law By Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb Owners of standard essential patents (SEPs) are cast as villains for engaging in “patent hold-up,” i.e., taking advantage of the fact that they negotiate royalties with implementer-licensees that already have made sunk investments in the […]

Innovation and the Firm: A New Synthesis

Posted by Social Science Research Network Innovation and the Firm: A New Synthesis By Peter Lee (University of California) Abstract:       Recent scholarship highlights the prevalence of vertical disintegration in high-technology industries, wherein specialized entities along a value chain transfer knowledge-intensive assets between them. Patents play a critical role in this process by […]

Antitrust and the Design of Production

Posted by Social Science Research Network Antitrust and the Design of Production By Herbert J. Hovenkamp (University of Pennsylvania) Abstract:      Both economics and antitrust policy have traditionally distinguished “production” from “distribution.” The former is concerned with how products are designed and built, the latter with how they are placed into the hands of […]

Patent Pool Outsiders

Posted by Social Science Research Network Patent Pool Outsiders By Michael Mattioli (Indiana University) Abstract:      Individuals who decline to join cooperative groups—outsiders—raise concerns in many areas of law and policy. From trade policy to climate agreements to class action procedures, the fundamental concern is the same: a single member of the group who […]

Reasonable Patent Exhaustion

Posted by Social Science Research Network Reasonable Patent Exhaustion By Herbert J. Hovenkamp (University of Pennsylvania) Abstract:      A lengthy tug of war between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals may have ended when the Supreme Court held that the sale of a patented article exhausts the patentee seller’s rights […]

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