Briefing Room: Cartel Detection And The Use Of Screens To Uncover Price Conspiracies
Introduction
Briefing Room about Cartel Detection And The Use Of Screens To Uncover Price Conspiracies.
The use of screens has been integral in cartel detection, but also has a very meaningful place in cartel prevention and defense.
The briefing room starts by reviewing the way screens, as well as other detection tools, are used in practice to uncover pricing conspiracies and to determine whether collusion is present in a specific market.
Leading off this discussion in the form of an engaging webinar series was a panel of knowledgeable experts widely recognized as the premier thought leaders in the subject.
This first webinar, held on May 22nd, was a nuanced overview of cartel detection headlined by guest editor Rosa Abrantes-Metz (GlobalEcon, NYU Stern School of Business), Antonio Capobianco (OECD), Carlos Mena-Labarthe (Federal Competition Commission of Mexico), and Carlos Ragazzo (Administrative Council for Economic Defense, Brazil). It was moderated by David S. Evans (GlobalEcon, University of Chicago Law School).
We then turned our focus to a robust webinar discussion on the value of screens in cartel prevention and the creative usage of screens on the defense side.
This second webinar, held a week after the first on May 28th, featured guest editor Rosa Abrantes-Metz (GlobalEcon, NYU Stern School of Business), Kai Huschelrath (ZEW), Donald C. Klawiter (Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP), Danny Sokol (Levin College of Law at the University of Florida). This was also moderated by David S. Evans (GlobalEcon, University of Chicago Law School).
Background Information From Our Experts
The Lessons from LIBOR for Detection and Deterrence of Cartel Wrongdoing
by Rosa Abrantes-Metz (NYU Stern School of Business) and Daniel Sokol (University of Florida Levin College of Law). An examination of the fallout from the LIBOR scandal and the key takeaways as it relates to cartels.
Conspiracy Screens: Practical Defense Perspectives
by Donald Klawiter (Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP). A cornerstone paper on how screens provide an additional and complementary tool that fits perfect into the leniency paradigm, enhancing detection and punishment around the globe.
Beyond Detection: The Management of Cartel Cases
by Carlos Ragazzo (CADE) and Diogo Thomson de Andrade (CADE). This paper gives insight into the management of cartel cases from the perspective of Brazil’s Competition Authority.
Mexican Experience in Screens for Bid-Rigging
by Carlos Mena-Labarthe (Federal Competition Commission of Mexico). In Mexico, as in other parts of the world, leniency is regarded as one of the most important and useful tools for the detection and prosecution of cartels.
The Adoption of Screening Tools by Competition Authorities
by Ulrich Laitenberger (ZEW) and Kai Huschelrath (ZEW). From an economic perspective, the fight against hardcore cartels is justified by the clearly negative welfare implications of such “agreements among competitiors”. So what are the general options Competition Authorities can use to detect cartels?
Collusion and Unilateral Price Announcements
by Antonio Capobianco (OECD). Greater transparency in the market is generally a factor that enhances efficiency and, as such, it is welcome by competition agencies.
However, market transparency can also produce anticompetitive effects by facilitating collusion or providing firms with focal points around which to align tacitly their behavior.
