Sep 03, 2013
CPI Cartel Column edited by Rosa Abrantes-Metz (Global Economics Group/NYU Stern School of Business)
Welcome to the August edition (being released post-Labor Day) of “From Collusion to Competition,” dedicated to India. We have the privilege of having Mr. K K Sharma’s contribution. The author is currently from K K Law Offices and formerly the Director General of the Competition Commission of India. The article, titled “India: Prohibition of anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position,” discusses the Competition Commission of India’s recent new enforcement powers on the prohibition of anticompetitive arrangements, cartels and abuse of dominance cases. These new enforcement powers follow what was the Commission’s exclusive focus on competition advocacy. The article also discusses some recent cases of interest. Great reading, I hope you enjoy it.
In our next issue later in the month, we will be learning about the excellent work the World Bank has been pursuing in terms of anti-cartel efforts.
I would like to close this issue with one final note. As readers of this column may know, I am a big fan of screens for conspiracies and manipulations. These are econometric models designed to flag conspiracies and manipulations through the identification of outliers on prices, bids, volumes, and other variables of interest. A survey of these tools can be found in my CPI Journal article with Professor Bajari. These tools have successfully flagged numerous such anticompetitive practices, and most recently, the LIBOR matters. I am happy to say that screens are gaining popularity around the world for multiple applications, including to competition policy.
As part of this increased interest, on 30 October 2013 the OECD Competition Committee will hold a roundtable discussion on “Ex officio cartel investigations and the use of screens to detect cartels.” The roundtable will feature contributions from the competition authorities of the 34 OECD member states and 15 observer countries as well as contributions by me, Professor Schinkel and Professor Kovacic. This roundtable will address two aspects: i) the relationship between proactive and reactive cartel detection methods and the proper balance between them to achieve an optimal level of cartel deterrence and detection; and ii) the use of screens by competition authorities to detect likely cartels and initiate antitrust investigations. I very much look forward to a lively discussion on this topic!
Happy reading!
Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz
Featured News
FTC to Approve Exxon’s $64 Billion Deal with Pioneer Resources, Excludes
May 1, 2024 by
CPI
UK Competition Watchdog Raises Alarm Over Nvidia’s ARM Takeover
May 1, 2024 by
CPI
Sen. Klobuchar Urges Regulators to Probe Collusion in Health Care Pricing
May 1, 2024 by
CPI
Multiple States Join Tennessee’s Antitrust Lawsuit Against NCAA Over NIL Rules
May 1, 2024 by
CPI
NY AG Joins Suit Challenging NCAA’s Restrictions on Student Athlete NIL Rights
May 1, 2024 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Economics of Criminal Antitrust
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
Navigating Economic Expert Work in Criminal Antitrust Litigation
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
The Increased Importance of Economics in Cartel Cases
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
A Law and Economics Analysis of the Antitrust Treatment of Physician Collective Price Agreements
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI
Information Exchange In Criminal Antitrust Cases: How Economic Testimony Can Tip The Scales
Apr 19, 2024 by
CPI