EU Merger Policy after the 2004 Reform: More Economic Approach, Fewer Challenges

Posted by Social Science Research Network EU Merger Policy after the 2004 Reform: More Economic Approach, Fewer Challenges By Federico Mini Abstract:     I conduct an empirical analysis of European Commission’s decisions on horizontal mergers before and after the 2004 reform, which introduced a “more economic approach” to merger control. The new approach did not […]

Transposition of the Antitrust Damages Directive into German Law

Posted by Social Science Research Network Transposition of the Antitrust Damages Directive into German Law By Christian Kersting (Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf) Abstract:     The article discusses the implementation measures taken by the German legislator to transpose the antitrust damages directive (directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements […]

Is EU Merger Control Used for Protectionism? An Empirical Analysis

Posted by Social Science Research Network Is EU Merger Control Used for Protectionism? An Empirical Analysis By Anu Bradford, Robert J. Jackson Jr. & Jonathon Zytnick (Columbia University) Abstract:     The European Commission has often used its merger-review power to challenge high-profile acquisitions involving non-EU companies, giving rise to concerns that its competition authority has […]

The Need for Clarification on Product Hopping: Open Questions after Namenda and Doryx

Posted by Social Science Research Network The Need for Clarification on Product Hopping: Open Questions after Namenda and Doryx By Lindsey M. Edwards (Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati) Abstract:     Several tensions exist between the Second Circuit’s decision in Namenda and the Third Circuit’s decision in Doryx, leaving unanswered a number of questions about product […]

Collusion: Is it Really that Bad?

Posted by Social Science Research Network Collusion: Is it Really that Bad? By Adriaan Ten Kate Sr. Abstract:     Collusion, particularly collusion is in the form of hardcore cartel behavior, is the worst antitrust offense of all. People engaging in such conduct should be punished severely. That is the consensus among antitrust officials. I argue […]

Presumptions in EU Competition Law

Posted by Social Science Research Network Presumptions in EU Competition Law By Cyril Ritter (DG Comp) Abstract:     A presumption is usually defined as using a known fact to infer another fact. However, presumptions could be defined more broadly, as including several types of logical leaps, shortcuts, automatisms, burden-shifting mechanisms and predispositions. Using more than […]

EU’s antitrust ‘war’ on Google and Facebook uses abandoned American playbook

Posted by Social Science Research Network The Conversation The casual observer could be forgiven for thinking that European antitrust regulators have declared war on American tech giants. On June 27, the European Union imposed a €2.4 billion (US$2.75 billion) fine on Google for giving favorable treatment in its search engine results to its own comparison […]

Japan: JFTC targeting dominance in data

Posted by Social Science Research Network Financial Times By Robin Harding in Tokyo Japan is considering tough new rules on handling data in an effort to head off digital monopolies, the country’s top competition regulator has said. In an interview with the Financial Times, Kazuyuki Sugimoto, head of the Japan Fair Trade Commission, said the issue […]

Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem

Posted by Social Science Research Network Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem By Mark A. Lemley (Stanford Law School) Abstract:     This article evaluates the economics of the Internet and Internet-related software markets, which are heavily driven towards standardization. It suggests that a traditional section 2 antitrust analysis will fail to effectively regulate competition in […]

Antitrust for Institutional Investors

Posted by Social Science Research Network Antitrust for Institutional Investors By Edward B. Rock (New York University) & Daniel L. Rubinfeld (University of California) Abstract:     With the increasing concentration of shares in the hands of large institutional investors, combined with greater involvement in corporate governance, the antitrust risk of common ownership has moved to […]

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