I distinguish between data-based digital antitrust cases and non data-based cases. So far, the emphasis has been on traditional cases where data did not play a direct role. Although new names are used, the theories of harm are also traditional: bundling, exclusive dealing, and foreclosure. While the remedies obtained in some cases have been criticized, I believe that they are appropriate “looking forward” (preventing continuing damage to competition). There might however be a need to focus more on the “damage repairing” function of remedies. There have been few data-based cases. One of the reasons is that property rights on data and basic regulatory rules have not yet been spelled out. In this sense the ongoing allocation of tasks between regulation and antitrust is important.

By Pierre Regibeau1

 

I. INTRODUCTION

While the digital revolution has brought many new products and improved on the delivery of goods and services, it has also raised concerns about increased concentration and potentially abusive conducts that might not be captured adequately by a traditional application of competition policy tools. Of particular note is the increasingly powerful position of so-called digital “gatekeepers,” i.e. digital platforms with significant market power – or even a dominant position – in at least one of the markets in which they are active. While the GAFAMs are the posterchildren of digital gatekeepers, other strong digital players such as various bookin

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