In this issue:
A Colloquy on Tying
The takeaway point of Tirole’s excellent primer is that tying, while potentially exclusionary, does not deserve special treatment. This commentary offers two reasons why tying should be accorded special treatment.
This primer analyzes factors that make ties more likely either to hurt or to benefit consumers. It first identifies factors that influence where the impact of tying on competition in the tied market stands, ranging from little impact on the rivals ability to compete to total exclusion of competitors. Then, after reviewing anticompetitive and efficiency-enhancing motives for tying, it argues that tying should be submitted to a rule of reason standard.
How Economics Can Improve Antitrust Doctrine towards Tie-In Sales: Comment on Jean Tirole’s “The Analysis of Tying Cases”
Tirole has written an excellent primer focused on what is known about tying and what he believes is desirable antitrust policy concerning the practice. Although the authors agree with most of Tirole’s arguments, there are two topics for which our perspective is somewhat different.
About the Journal
Introduction by the editor-in-chief to the inaugural issue of Competition Policy International.
A Symposium on Monti’s Legacy
Commissioner Mario Monti’s achievements in relation to Article 81 of the EC Treaty include three are major reforms: (1) the modernization of EC competition law; (2) the introduction of a more economics-based analysis for Article 81 cases; (3) and the fight against cartels.
Commissioner Mario Monti’s impact on Article 82 of the EC Treaty during his period as EC Competition Commissioner has not been as revolutionary as his impact on other areas of EC competition law.
Mario Monti’s tenure as EC Commissioner for competition policy between September 1999 and November 2004 coincided with one of the most eventful periods in EC merger control since the Merger Regulation came into force in 1990.
The Changing Role of Economics in Competition Policy Decisions by the European Commission During the Monti Years
This paper examines the evolution of the use of economics in EC competition policy matters and the reforms in the use of economics that occurred in the latter part of EC Competition Commissioner Mario Monti’s term (1999-2004).
The departure of Commissioner Mario Monti from his post as the EC Commissioner for competition policy provides a good opportunity to reflect upon the achievements and perceived failures of the European Commission in the field of antitrust law over the past five years.
From the Editor
Welcome to the first issue of Competition Policy International. This inaugural volume begins with a colloquy about tying, an unsettled area in both economics and law.
In this article, Frank Easterbrook sets out the basic components of what has become known as the error-cost framework in antitrust, an approach that has gained influence in recent years.
In this article, Oliver Williamson sets out the case for taking efficiency gains into account when analyzing allegedly anticompetitive conduct, especially in the case of mergers. The welfare tradeoff model applies most easily to the case of two firms that merge into a monopoly.