CPI 3(1)

Spring 2007, Volume 3 Number 1

In this issue:
Antitrust with Intellectual Property
  1. Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, Apr 19, 2007

    The Logic and Limits of Ex Ante Competition in a Standard-Setting Environment

    Some scholars have questioned the process by which cooperative standards are typically set, worrying about the potential for anticompetitive market power to come hand in hand with pro-competitive interoperability.

  2. Richard Gilbert, Apr 19, 2007

    Holding Innovation to an Antitrust Standard

    This article analyzes several tests for predatory innovation, including the rule of reason based on total and consumer welfare and profit sacrifice tests.

  3. Maurits Dolmans, Paul-John Loewenthal, Robert O'Donoghue, Apr 19, 2007

    Are Article 82 EC and Intellectual Property Interoperable? The State of the Law Pending the Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission

    The objectives of intellectual property rights (IPR) and competition law are essentially the same: both promote innovation to the benefit of consumers.

Market Definition
  1. Dennis Carlton, Apr 19, 2007

    Market Definition: Use and Abuse

    Market definition is a crude though sometimes useful tool for identifying market power. The ambiguity in what analysts mean by market power (price above marginal cost, or excess profits) cannot be resolved by market share.

  2. Jordi Gual, Apr 19, 2007

    Time to Rethink Merger Policy?

    This paper provides a critical analysis of some of the key features of merger policy as understood and practiced in leading jurisdictions such as the European Community and the United States.

From the Editor
  1. Richard Schmalensee, Apr 17, 2007

    From the Editor: Spring 2007

    Our fifth issue of <i>Competition Policy International</i> brings diverse fare from 29 leading economists and lawyers from the European Community and the United States.

Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platforms
  1. Jean-Charles Rochet, Jean Tirole, Apr 19, 2007

    Introduction to the Symposium

    The contributions presented in this volume are a good illustration of the incredible richness and depth of the challenges posed by multi-sided industries.

  2. David Evans, Richard Schmalensee, Apr 19, 2007

    The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms

    This paper provides a brief introduction to the economics of two-sided platforms and the implications for antitrust analysis.

  3. Janusz Ordover, Apr 19, 2007

    Comments on Evans & Schmalensee’s “The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms”

    A freshman student in economics or a Nobel prize-winning macroeconomist who has lately stumbled across a journal or two in industrial organization economics may be somewhat perplexed or confused by many references to two-sided markets. Surely, is it not the case that all markets have two sides, namely buyers and sellers?

  4. Renata Hesse, Apr 19, 2007

    Two-Sided Platform Markets and the Application of the Traditional Antitrust Analytical Framework

    It only takes working through a single matter that involves a two-sided market to recognize that the antitrust analysis can be a bit more complicated than with standard one-sided markets.

  5. Marc Rysman, Apr 19, 2007

    The Empirics of Antitrust in Two-Sided Markets

    This paper studies several issues in which empirical contributions can impact antitrust in the context of two-sided markets. For each issue, I discuss recent empirical research that exemplifies my point.

  6. David Park, William Rooney, Apr 19, 2007

    The Two-Sided Market Literature Enriches Traditional Antitrust Analysis

    To the extent that the two-sided market literature improves competitive-effects analysis, it improves the fundamental purpose of antitrust law.

  7. Amelia Fletcher, Apr 19, 2007

    Predatory Pricing in Two-Sided Markets: A Brief Comment

    Over the past few years, there has been a burgeoning literature on two-sided markets and economic understanding of such markets has improved hugely. Less attention has, however, been paid to how competition policy should be applied in two-sided markets.

  8. Thomas Brown, Kevin L. Yingling, Apr 19, 2007

    Antitrust and Real Estate: A Two-Sided Approach

    From 1996 to 2005, the residential real estate industry witnessed the greatest run-up in prices ever seen. But to hear most residential real estate agents tell it, the boom passed them by.

  9. John Wotton, Apr 19, 2007

    Are Media Markets Analyzed as Two-Sided Markets?

    This paper sets out to describe how, in practice, the U.K. competition authorities analyze competition in those markets in the media sector, which may have the characteristics of two-sided markets.

  10. Leonard Waverman, Apr 19, 2007

    Two-Sided Telecom Markets and the Unintended Consequences of Business Strategy

    In this brief paper, I examine the two-sided nature of telecommunications. It is clear that a traditional telecom is a platform allowing a calling party (C) to connect to a receiving party (R). However, it is, in a sense, too easy to label economic activity as two-sided. Without clear limits, most activities appear to be of a twosided nature. Therefore, I begin by examining whether telecoms meet the conditions of two-sidedness as defined by Tirole and Rochet in their 2007 paper.

  11. Wilko Bolt, Apr 19, 2007

    Retail Payments and Card Use in the Netherlands: Pricing, Scale, and Antitrust

    Efficient payment systems are essential components of well-functioning economies and financial markets, facilitating the exchange of goods, services, and assets.

  12. Duarte Brito, Pedro Pereira, Apr 19, 2007

    Mobile Virtual Network Operators: Beyond the Hyperbolae

    In this paper, we discuss briefly, and in non-technical terms, some aspects related to the entry of MVNOs. These aspects range from issues related to the entry process itself, such as barriers to entry and exclusionary practices, to the effects of entry on prices and product differentiation.

  13. Richard Epstein, Apr 19, 2007

    Contingent Commissions in Insurance: A Legal and Economic Analysis

    It is not easy to come up with a powerful efficiency explanation for the use of contingent commission agreements, but if these agreements continue to be adopted with full disclosure in the absence of collusion, then it seems premature to ban them just because our incomplete knowledge of how brokerage markets work does not supply a compelling efficiency justification for their use.

Current Cases
  1. Rachel Brandenburger, Thomas Janssens, Apr 19, 2007

    The Impala Judgment: Does EC Merger Control Need to Be Fixed or Fine-Tuned?

    In its <i>Impala</i> judgment last year, the Court of First Instance annulled a European Commission unconditional merger clearance decision for the first time.

Book Reviews
  1. Massimo Motta, Apr 19, 2007

    Review of Michael Whinston, Lectures on Antitrust Economics (MIT Press, 2006)

    Michael Whinston is one of the economists who have contributed most to the understanding of antitrust issues. His works, alone or with co-authors (especially Douglas Bernheim and Ilya Segal), have shed light on such issues as exclusive contracts, tying, and multi-market collusion among others. For this reason, the publication of his book <i>Lectures on Antitrust Economics</i> is an event many people have looked forward to. They will not be disappointed.


About the CPI Journal

Competition Policy International is a peer-reviewed, academic journal that covers competition law, economics, and policy. Issues are published twice a year in the Spring and Autumn and in both print and online forms (print ISSN 1554-0189; online ISSN 1554-6853).

Past Issues


Richard Schmalensee
MIT Sloan School of Management
Cambridge, MA, U.S.A.

Dennis W. Carlton
University of Chicago
Chicago, IL, U.S.A.

Keith N. Hylton
Boston University School of Law
Boston, MA, U.S.A.

A. Jorge Padilla
Brussels, Belgium

John Temple Lang
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton
Brussels, Belgium

David S. Evans
University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, U.S.A. and University College London, London, U.K.

Editorial Board
Christian Ahlborn
London, U.K.

Kelyn Bacon
Brick Court Chambers
London, U.K.

Antonio Bavasso
Allen & Overy and University College London
London, U.K.

Rachel Brandenburger
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
Brussels, Belgium

Ronald A. Cass
Center for the Rule of Law
Washington, DC, U.S.A.

Wayne Dale Collins
Shearman & Sterling
New York, NY, U.S.A.

Frank H. Easterbrook
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit
Chicago, IL, U.S.A.

Richard Epstein
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago, IL, U.S.A.

John Fingleton
U.K. Office of Fair Trading
London, U.K.

Luke M. Froeb
Vanderbilt Owen Graduate School of Management
Nashville, TN, U.S.A.

Rafael Garcia-Valdecasas
The Court of First Instance

Douglas H. Ginsburg
U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit
Washington, DC, U.S.A.

Francis Jacobs
King's College London
London, U.K.

Valentine Korah
University College London
London, U.K.

Janet McDavid
Hogan & Hartson
Washington, DC, U.S.A.

Mario Monti
Bocconi University
Milan, Italy

Massimo Motta
European University Institute
Firenze, Italy

Timothy J. Muris
George Mason University School of Law
Arlington, VA, U.S.A.

Anne Perrot
Conseil de la Concurrence
Paris, France

Richard Posner
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit
Chicago, IL, U.S.A.

Patrick Rey
IDEI and University of Toulouse
Toulouse, France

William Rooney
Willkie Farr & Gallagher
New York, NY, U.S.A.

Akinori Uesugi
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer
Tokyo, Japan

Sang-Seung Yi
Seoul National University
Seoul, Korea