Antitrust with Intellectual Property
Some scholars have questioned the process by which cooperative standards are typically set, worrying about the potential for anticompetitive market power to come hand in hand with pro-competitive interoperability.
This article analyzes several tests for predatory innovation, including the rule of reason based on total and consumer welfare and profit sacrifice tests.
Are Article 82 EC and Intellectual Property Interoperable? The State of the Law Pending the Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission
The objectives of intellectual property rights (IPR) and competition law are essentially the same: both promote innovation to the benefit of consumers.
Market definition is a crude though sometimes useful tool for identifying market power. The ambiguity in what analysts mean by market power (price above marginal cost, or excess profits) cannot be resolved by market share.
This paper provides a critical analysis of some of the key features of merger policy as understood and practiced in leading jurisdictions such as the European Community and the United States.
From the Editor
Our fifth issue of Competition Policy International brings diverse fare from 29 leading economists and lawyers from the European Community and the United States.
Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platforms
The contributions presented in this volume are a good illustration of the incredible richness and depth of the challenges posed by multi-sided industries.
This paper provides a brief introduction to the economics of two-sided platforms and the implications for antitrust analysis.
A freshman student in economics or a Nobel prize-winning macroeconomist who has lately stumbled across a journal or two in industrial organization economics may be somewhat perplexed or confused by many references to two-sided markets. Surely, is it not the case that all markets have two sides, namely buyers and sellers?
It only takes working through a single matter that involves a two-sided market to recognize that the antitrust analysis can be a bit more complicated than with standard one-sided markets.
This paper studies several issues in which empirical contributions can impact antitrust in the context of two-sided markets. For each issue, I discuss recent empirical research that exemplifies my point.
To the extent that the two-sided market literature improves competitive-effects analysis, it improves the fundamental purpose of antitrust law.
Over the past few years, there has been a burgeoning literature on two-sided markets and economic understanding of such markets has improved hugely. Less attention has, however, been paid to how competition policy should be applied in two-sided markets.
From 1996 to 2005, the residential real estate industry witnessed the greatest run-up in prices ever seen. But to hear most residential real estate agents tell it, the boom passed them by.
This paper sets out to describe how, in practice, the U.K. competition authorities analyze competition in those markets in the media sector, which may have the characteristics of two-sided markets.
In this brief paper, I examine the two-sided nature of telecommunications. It is clear that a traditional telecom is a platform allowing a calling party (C) to connect to a receiving party (R). However, it is, in a sense, too easy to label economic activity as two-sided. Without clear limits, most activities appear to be of a twosided nature. Therefore, I begin by examining whether telecoms meet the conditions of two-sidedness as defined by Tirole and Rochet in their 2007 paper.
Efficient payment systems are essential components of well-functioning economies and financial markets, facilitating the exchange of goods, services, and assets.
In this paper, we discuss briefly, and in non-technical terms, some aspects related to the entry of MVNOs. These aspects range from issues related to the entry process itself, such as barriers to entry and exclusionary practices, to the effects of entry on prices and product differentiation.
It is not easy to come up with a powerful efficiency explanation for the use of contingent commission agreements, but if these agreements continue to be adopted with full disclosure in the absence of collusion, then it seems premature to ban them just because our incomplete knowledge of how brokerage markets work does not supply a compelling efficiency justification for their use.
In its Impala judgment last year, the Court of First Instance annulled a European Commission unconditional merger clearance decision for the first time.
Michael Whinston is one of the economists who have contributed most to the understanding of antitrust issues. His works, alone or with co-authors (especially Douglas Bernheim and Ilya Segal), have shed light on such issues as exclusive contracts, tying, and multi-market collusion among others. For this reason, the publication of his book Lectures on Antitrust Economics is an event many people have looked forward to. They will not be disappointed.