A PYMNTS Company

Blog o’ Blogs March 2014

 |  April 29, 2014

March 2014, Volume 4, Number 3

 

 

 

We’re mostly looking at the intellectual interpinnings of antitrust this month. The late Phillip Areeda inspired our first two entries and then we move on to exclusive dealing, fines, Google, bright lines, risk sharing, technology, vertical integration, and public entities.

 

 

 

Antitrust quote of the day and the evolution of the law on refusal to supply

Instead the Court gave a practical illustration of how its hammer can make square pegs fit round holes.

Alfonso Lamadrid (Chillin’Competition)

 

 

 

It’s not only essential facilities that need limiting principles

So I think-although as I say I’m sure that Areeda wouldn’t-that current US law on predation provides a very good example of Areeda’s concern.

Kevin Coates (21st Century Competition)

 

 

 

Commissioner Wright’s McWane Dissent Illuminates the Law and Economics of Exclusive Dealing

Mere harm to an individual competitor is not enough.

Thom Lambert (Truth on the Market)

 

 

 

Are penalties for cartels excessive and, if they are, should we be concerned?

If the claim is that enforcement is harming companies not engaged in collusive practices then evidence is needed of these deterred legitimate activities before enforcement is weakened.

Joseph Harrington (Competition Academia.com)

 

 

 

Arbitration in the Google/MMI order

Here is a roadmap for understanding how and when arbitration could occur under the Google/MMI Order.

Peggy Bayer Femenella & Susan Huber (FTC’s Competition Matters)

 

 

 

The Google commitments and the transformation of EU antittrust enforcement

In particular, the increasing reliance on commitments has moved the “negotiation” of remedies to the center of the enforcement process, to the point of conflating in practice with the determination of the underlying theory of harm.

Damien Gerard (Kluwer Competition Law Blog)

 

 

 

Are Bright-Line Rules The Right Prescription For Reverse-Payment Cases?

Another school of thought emphasizes that, in antitrust law, substance and economic reality should trump form.

Jeffrey I. Shinder & Ankur Kapoor (Antitrust Today)

 

 

 

 

Sharing Risk in Collective Actions

In the short term, synthetic risk sharing arrangements may offer a solution. 

Elaine Whiteford & Oliver Gayner (Competition Bulletin)

 

 

 

Antitrust & Associations: “Standard Setting Can Be Risky Business”

Recent court decisions reflect plaintiffs’ proclivity to sue SSOs and their corporate members when they believe themselves to have been injured by real or imagined conspiracies that have infiltrated the standard-setting process.

Burt Braverman (Canadian Competition & Regulatory Law)

 

 

 

Innovation, competition and IP in developing countries: convergence or customization?

Absolute convergence of antitrust enforcement might not suit the current economic stage of most developing countries, particularly in Africa.

Sofia Ranchordás (African Antitrust & Competition Law News & Analysis)

 

 

 

 

Antitrust fines may increase distortions in the economy

It is perhaps time to change these distortive rules-of-thumb that make revenue so central for calculating penalties, if the only thing the distortions buy for us is saving the costs of data collection and illegal profits estimation.

Vasiliki Bageri, Yannis Katsoulacos, & Giancarlo Spagnolo (Competition Academia)

 

 

 

Widgets All The Way Down

Comcast further expanding its distribution footprint could create concerns about its vertical integration that weren’t there when it was smaller.

Adam Miller (UpwardPricingPressure)

 

 

 

Applying the Antitrust Laws to Anticompetitive State and Local Government Conduct

But state and local restraints are the worst because they are ingrained in an economy through the power of law. Even the greatest innovators can’t overcome that-unless, of course, they curry the right favor with the government. But that isn’t competition; that is cronyism.

Jarod Bona (The Antitrust Attorney Blog)