Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?

Posted by Social Science Research Network

Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence? Joseph A. Clougherty (University of Illinois), Tomaso Duso (DIW Berlin), Miyu Lee (Humboldt University of Berlin) & Jo Seldeslachts (University of Amsterdam)

Abstract: We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as – unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions – phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find that phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries.