Most-Favoured-Customer Clauses and Two-Sided Platforms

Posted by Social Science Research Network

Most-Favoured-Customer Clauses and Two-Sided Platforms

Daniel Zimmer (University of Bonn) & Martin Blaschczok (Government Germany)

Abstract:      Clauses stipulating preferential treatment, known as ‘most-favoured-nation’ (MFN) or ‘most-favoured-customer’ (MFC) clauses, have received increased competition-law attention owing to the proceedings of the European Commission and the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice against Apple and five international publishing groups in the E-Books case, as well as the proceedings of the German Federal Cartel Authority against Amazon and HRS. The article delineates the specific characteristics of two-sided platforms and the various types of preferential clauses and their effects on competition. After a brief description of the above-mentioned case proceedings, the contribution pursues the question of how most-favoured-customer clauses that favour two-sided platforms should be assessed under European competition law.