The Law and Economics of Tying

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David Evans, Christian Ahlborn, Jorge Padilla, Michael Salinger, Nov 03, 2006

GCP is the occasional publisher of topic-based ebooks — electronic compilations of previously published work by notable competition authories. This GCP collection features the research and insights of several economists and practitioners on the economics of tying law.

In this Volume

  • Ahlborn, Christian, David S. Evans, and A. Jorge Padilla, “The Antitrust Economics of Tying: A Farewell to Per Se Illegality,” originally published in The Antitrust Bulletin (2004).
  • Evans, David S., A. Jorge Padilla, and Michael A. Salinger, “A Pragmatic Approach to Identifying and Analysing Legitimate Tying Cases,” originally published in European Competition Law Annual 2003: What is an Abuse of Dominant Position? (2006).
  • Evans, David S. and Michael Salinger, “Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law,” originally published in Yale Journal on Regulation (2005).
  • Evans, David S., “Untying the Knot: The Case for Overruling Jefferson Parish,” submission to the DOJ/FTC’s 2006 Public Hearings on Single-Firm Conduct and Antitrust Law.

GCP would like to thank the journals that have generously lent these papers for republication.

Links to Full Content

Tying eCollection (Nov. 2006)

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