The post-cartel equilibrium puzzle in the German cement market: A reply to Huschelrath, Muller and Veith

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Niels Frank (Lademann & Associates GmbH and University of Bayreuth) and Philipp Schliffke offer The post-cartel equilibrium puzzle in the German cement market: A reply to Huschelrath, Muller and Veith

ABSTRACT: Kai Huschelrath, Kathrin Muller, and Tobias Veith study the German cement cartel that lasted from the beginning of the 1990s until the end of 2001. Using both a during-and-after and a yardstick difference-in-difference approach, they estimate cartel overcharges between 20 percent and 26.5 percent, pointing out that they have explicitly considered alternativ

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