United States’ Law on Refusal to Deal after the Trinko Decision of the Supreme Court

Posted by Social Science Research Network

United States’ Law on Refusal to Deal after the Trinko Decision of the Supreme Court

‘Damola Adediji (Munich Intellectual Property Law Center)

Abstract:      This paper analyses the present position of the Law on Refusal to deal in the United States since the Supreme Court decided Trinko in 2004. It analyzes the reasoning of the Court in Trinko case and the cherry-picking effects of this reasoning as seen in refusal to deal cases that came up before appellate courts. Trinko’s legislative history is captured in the Telecommunication Act of 1996. The Act is to ensure competition in the telecommunication market in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American Telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunication technologies. The Supreme Court surprisingly in Trinko however found the Telecom Act too ambitious for Antitrust Law. This paper concludes that there is almost nothing left of the refusal to deal claims brought under the Sherman Act.