Judicial Review of Antitrust Cases
Judicial Review in EC Competition Law: Reflections on the Role of the Community Courts in the EC System of Competition Law Enforcement
This paper sets out personal reflections on the role of the judiciary within a primarily administrative system of enforcement of the competition laws.
The first two articles of this issue are based on presentations for the inaugural edition of the University College London Antitrust Forum held on March 3, 2005.
This paper offers a historical overview of private antitrust enforcement in the United States and an explanation of why private case filings have increased and decreased over the years.
From the Editor
The second issue of Competition Policy International begins with articles by two distinguished jurists representing both sides of the Atlantic.
A Colloquy on Vertical Restrictions
Until theory can be used to determine how likely it is that a restraint will lead to an anticompetitive outcome, decision makers will be left with a considerable amount of uncertainty.
This paper provides a critical analysis of the paper on vertical restraints and competition policy by James Cooper et al.
Cooper, Froeb, OBrien, and Vita argue that (1) economic theory, especially post-Chicago theory, provides little in the way of unambiguous predictions of when vertical restraints are pro-competitive versus anticompetitive, forcing antitrust decisions to rely mainly on prior empirical evidence rather than case-specific facts; and (2) prior evidence indicates that vertical restraints are unlikely to harm consumers. Antitrust policy, therefore, should be lenient towards the restraints.
A Symposium on Loyalty Rebates
This paper reviews the pro-competitive and anticompetitive motives for loyalty rebates. This paper concludes by proposing a structured rule of reason for the antitrust handling of loyalty rebates cases.
The courts treatment of loyalty discounts under U.S. antitrust laws is broadly consistent with an approach that recognizes the high costs of erroneously condemning behavior that would lower prices and increase welfare, and the speculative nature of the anticompetitive harm that might result.
Abuse of dominance is the area where the divergence between U.S. and EC antitrust enforcement practices is still very significant. In particular, in the European Community, the identification of price abuses is mostly based on the abstract ability to exclude, while in the United States, the emphasis is mainly on visible and tangible effects.
Perhaps no area of antitrust law provokes as much controversy as predatory pricing, the theory that a firm violates the antitrust laws by setting its price too low.
In this article, Professors Areeda and Turner analyze the predatory pricing offense in terms of its economic underpinnings.
In this article, Professor Yamey reviews the post-war contributions to the literature and analysis of predatory price cutting.