Briefing Room

Competition and Regulation in Multi-sided platforms Competition Policy International has been at the forefront of the issue of Multi-Sided platforms and its theoretical development since the early days of 2003. World class experts on the subject, such as our own Editor-in-Chief Prof. David S Evans and contributors from all over the globe have built up […]

It Takes 2 to Tango: Competition Policy Analysis for 2-Sided Markets

It Takes 2 to Tango: Competition Policy Analysis for 2-Sided Markets

Two-sided markets is one of the hottest areas in economics and competition policy. Some businesses operate platforms that connect two groups of customers, help those customers interact, and in doing so create value. Economists and antitrust practitioners have known for a long time that advertising-supported media had two groups of customers: the readers and the […]

Why the Multi-Sided Platform Literature Kills the P≥MC Result and What It Means for Antitrust

David Evans, Aug 029, 2013 This is the second in a series of columns in which I am going to develop the argument that the economics profession now knows that many standard results do not in fact apply—at least not without modification—to businesses that are multisided platforms. These columns are based in part on a […]

Multi-Sided Platforms Column

What Twitter, the London Stock Exchange, and eHarmony Have in Common and Why the Capital Markets Industry Should Care – David S. Evans (GlobalEcon/UChicago) Supplement to Platform Economics: The Economics of Multi-Sided Businesses – David S. Evans (GlobalEcon/UChicago) What the Court’s Expert in the Interchange Fee Litigation Said about Analyzing Antitrust for Two-Sided Platforms – David S. Evans (GlobalEcon/UChicago) How Card Regulation is Killing […]

What Twitter, the London Stock Exchange, and eHarmony Have in Common and Why the Capital Markets Industry Should Care

What Twitter, the London Stock Exchange, and eHarmony Have in Common and Why the Capital Markets Industry Should Care

Nov 12, 2013 What Twitter, the London Stock Exchange, and eHarmony Have in Common and Why the Capital Markets Industry Should Care – David S. Evans (GlobalEcon/UChicago) At the turn of the century economists made an important discovery. That discovery has revolutionized how we analyze businesses like many of yours. It has huge practical implications […]

Supplement to Platform Economics: The Economics of Multi-Sided Businesses

Supplement to Platform Economics: The Economics of Multi-Sided Businesses

Oct 16, 2013 (Click here for a PDF version of the article.) I’ve written the following articles on multi-sided platforms since the publication of Platform Economics: Essays on Multi-Sided Businesses in December 2011. Hopefully, you’ll find them useful. The first article, the “Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platforms,” provides a survey of the literature on multi-sided […]

What the Court’s Expert in the Interchange Fee Litigation Said about Analyzing Antitrust for Two-Sided Platforms

What the Court’s Expert in the Interchange Fee Litigation Said about Analyzing Antitrust for Two-Sided Platforms

David Evans, Sep 10, 2013 (Click here for a PDF version of the article.) Last week a court appointed expert in the interchange fee litigation in the United States submitted a memorandum that evaluated the economic arguments presented by the plaintiffs and defendants. His memorandum highlights the importance of the new economic learning on two-sided […]

Is it Time to Exclude Experts Who Ignore the Multisided Platform Literature? Part I

Is it Time to Exclude Experts Who Ignore the Multisided Platform Literature? Part I

David Evans, Mar 13, 2013 (Click here for a PDF version of the article.) In the next several columns I am going to develop the argument that the economics profession now knows that many standard results do not in fact apply, at least not without modification, to businesses that are multisided platforms. This is based […]

Market Definition and Merger Analysis for Multi-Sided Platforms

David Evans, Richard Schmalensee, Nov 13, 2012 This paper provides a brief progress report on market definition and the analysis of mergers for multi-sided platforms. It provides an update to an earlier article on multi-sided platform market definition. (For an overview of multi-sided platforms including the antitrust analysis of these platforms see Platform Economics.)