By Martynas Jablonskis (University of Basel)
The article proposes a new method of attributing liability and calculating fines for cartel infringements. It borrows from the cooperative game theory – the field, which is rarely considered in legal scholarship. The central idea is to use Shapley value for calculating cartel fines. Shapley value itself is a well-established result in cooperative game theory. The concept is based on some simple axioms that are suitable for antitrust law. Originally, Shapley value solves the problem of how some coalition can split (allocate) its value based on players’ marginal contributions. The insight here is that a cartel can be thought of as coalition and cartel fines as Shapley allocations. The new approach also justifies liability for cartel facilitators and potentially can be extended outside antitrust law – namely, to tort law as the universal solution allocating damages for multiple tortfeasors.
