CPI 1(2)

Judicial Review of Antitrust Cases Bo Vesterdorf, Sep 01, 2005 Judicial Review in EC Competition Law: Reflections on the Role of the Community Courts in the EC System of Competition Law Enforcement This paper sets out personal reflections on the role of the judiciary within a primarily administrative system of enforcement of the competition laws. […]

From the Editor: Autumn 2005

Richard Schmalensee, Sep 01, 2005 The second issue of Competition Policy International begins with articles by two distinguished jurists representing both sides of the Atlantic. President Bo Vesterdorf, of the European Court of First Instance in Luxembourg, looks at the role of the EC courts in reviewing competition policy decisions by the European Commission. One […]

Judicial Review in EC Competition Law: Reflections on the Role of the Community Courts in the EC System of Competition Law Enforcement

Bo Vesterdorf, Sep 01, 2005 This paper sets out personal reflections on the role of the judiciary within a primarily administrative system of enforcement of the competition laws. The paper first goes through a short description of the basic features of the EC system of competition law enforcement. Second, it addresses the role of the […]

Tied and True Exclusion: Comment on Jean Tirole’s “The Analysis of Tying Cases”

Barry Nalebuff, Apr 01, 2005 The takeaway point of Tirole’s excellent primer is that tying, while potentially exclusionary, does not deserve special treatment. This commentary offers two reasons why tying should be accorded special treatment. First, unlike predatory pricing, tying offers a monopolist the ability to engage in no-cost predation. A critical component of the […]

Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments

Sep 01, 2005 In this article, Professor Yamey reviews the post-war contributions to the literature and analysis of predatory price cutting. While the point has been made frequently in the literature on predatory pricing that the practice makes little sense where entry into the industry in question is easy, the author gives several examples that […]

Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act

Sep 01, 2005 A firm may reduce its prices in an attempt to destroy its rivals or to deter new entry. Although the Sherman Act has long been construed to prohibit this practice, the case law on predatory pricing has been characterized by vagueness and a paucity of economic analysis. In this Article, Professors Areeda […]

Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy: A Reaction to Cooper, Froeb, O’Brien, and Vita

Ralph Winter, Sep 01, 2005 Cooper, Froeb, OBrien, and Vita argue that (1) economic theory, especially post-Chicago theory, provides little in the way of unambiguous predictions of when vertical restraints are pro-competitive versus anticompetitive, forcing antitrust decisions to rely mainly on prior empirical evidence rather than case-specific facts; and (2) prior evidence indicates that vertical […]

Classic Papers on Predatory Pricing

Keith Hylton, Sep 01, 2005 Perhaps no area of antitrust law provokes as much controversy as predatory pricing, the theory that a firm violates the antitrust laws by setting its price too low. Under the standard definition, predatory pricing involves a strategy of cutting price below the level at which a competitor can survive in […]

Below-Cost Pricing and Loyalty-Inducing Discounts: Are They Restrictive and If So, When?

Alberto Heimler, Sep 01, 2005 Abuse of dominance is the area where the divergence between U.S. and EC antitrust enforcement practices is still very significant. In particular, in the European Community, the identification of price abuses is mostly based on the abstract ability to exclude, while in the United States, the emphasis is mainly on […]

The Economics of Loyalty Rebates and Antitrust Law in the United States

Bruce Kobayashi, Sep 01, 2006 The courts treatment of loyalty discounts under U.S. antitrust laws is broadly consistent with an approach that recognizes the high costs of erroneously condemning behavior that would lower prices and increase welfare, and the speculative nature of the anticompetitive harm that might result. This content is for paid subscriptions only. […]